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[The following article is the second of a series. The first appeared in the 09/11/91 issue of the CAU.] .
Robinson The first concrete results of negotiations between the Guatemalan government and the
rebel coalition Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) were observed in July, when
the two sides reached agreement on the issue of democratization. The "Queretero Accord," named
after the Mexican city where the talks took place, was signed on July 25, after four days of tense
discussions. The event marked the third round of talks since negotiations commenced in April,
and the first agreement ever between the Guatemalan government and guerrilla leaders. The
Queretero Accord presents consensus by the two sides on the definition of democratization, and
specifically, of pre-requisites for democratization and peace in Guatemala. On paper at least, both
sides are committed to the same objectives for Guatemalan society. The agreement represents a
significant step in the peace process since it establishes a target framework for future negotiations.
The Accord emphasizes that strengthening "functional and participatory democracy" requires
the effective rule of law, development of democratic institutional life, dominance of civil society,
subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities, unrestricted respect for human rights,
and a permanent end to political repression. Next, the agreement states that democratization
requires "guaranteeing and promoting the direct and indirect participation of civil society in the
formulation, execution, and evaluation of government policies." In addition, all Guatemalans "must
have access to the benefits of national production and natural resources based on the principles of
social justice." The Guatemalan peace process opened in Oslo, Norway, in March 1990. The historic
meeting initiated a series of contacts between the URNG and diverse sectors of Guatemalan society
including political parties, and social, religious and business groups , under the auspices of the
National Reconciliation Commission (CNR). The "Oslo process" specified subsequent face-to-face
meetings between senior government officials and URNG commanders. Such encounters had been
continuously postponed by the former Christian Democrat president Vinicio Cerezo's government,
result of pressure from the military and the right. President Jorge Elias Serrano campaigned in
last year's elections on a peace platform, promising to open direct negotiations with the URNG
to end the armed conflict. Fulfilling this promise, Serrano sent a top level delegation to meet with
the guerrillas in Mexico City on April 24-26, marking the first direct meetings between official
government representatives and rebel leaders since the Guatemalan insurgency began 30 years
ago. At the April meeting, the two delegations agreed to an 11-point agenda for ongoing talks,
and on procedural regulations for the negotiations. Although the first point of the agenda was
democratization, the two delegations expressed very different interpretations of the meaning of the
concept. Consequently, no agreements emerged from the second round of talks which took place
June 17-22 in Cuernavaca, Mexico. In the words of President Serrano, the government understood
democratization to mean a "liberal system," in contrast to the guerrillas' "totalitarian concepts"
based on "outdated marxist-leninist theories." According to Serrano, a "democratic system" already
exists in Guatemala, requiring only "perfecting." The rebels, he added, must incorporate themselves
into the existing democracy. The URNG advocates participatory democracy, which encompasses
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the government's "liberal system," in addition to economic and social justice. In addition, rebel
leaders asserted that liberal democracy is inadequate, as long as systematic human rights violations
and political repression continue. At the conclusion of the talks in Cuernavaca, URNG commander
Pablo Monsanto said, "The government bases its arguments on respect for constitutionality and
institutionality, on defense of the existing legal framework, without focusing on the real political
situation. But democratization should involve an overall view of political, economic, social and
cultural aspects, (and) cannot be reduced to periodic electoral processes without the effective
participation of the people in decision-making." The two opposing views were reconciled in the
Queretero Accord. The URNG has tacitly recognized the legitimacy of the constitution. Thus, the
rebels have acknowledged that they must operate under the framework of the constitution, at least
in the medium and long-term. For its part, the government has accepted major tenets of the URNG's
concepts of participatory democracy and social justice. Moreover, the two sides demonstrated an
unusual flexibility, reaching an agreement which required both to make compromises and meet
halfway on a highly controversial issue. Msgr. Roldolfo Quezada Toruno, head of the National
Reconciliation Commission, said, "We are seeing from both sides a serious, flexible, and eager
attitude to reach some sort of agreement that will someday lead to the peace we all desire." In the
wake of the Queretaro conclave, Quezada has acted as official intermediary. Another factor in
pushing the peace process forward is the international community's support for and participation in
the negotiations. At the request of the URNG, and following consent by the government, the United
Nations has assumed an observer role. In the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran peace talks, the UN also
started out as "observer," but later moved into a variety of more direct mediating roles. Despite the
breakthrough in Queretero, the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the civil war in Guatemala
remain precarious and uncertain. The Accord represents agreement on only the first of 11 points
on the agenda for the talks. Successful conclusions to the talks are defined as a cease-fire and
guarantees for rebel incorporation into civilian political life. Other agenda items are basic human
rights, the role of the army, agrarian reform, a broad range of rights for indigenous communities,
constitutional and electoral reform, socio-economic conditions, resettlement of refugees and
displaced persons, the legal incorporation of URNG members into civilian politics, a definitive
cease-fire, demobilization, and a schedule for implementation, compliance, and international
verification. The second and third items in the agenda, human rights and the role of the army, are
bound to generate heated debate. These issues are inextricably lined to the impunity of the public
security forces, considered responsible for most human rights abuses in a country possessing the
worst human rights record in the hemisphere. Military impunity and prerogative at every level of
Guatemalan society are considered by many observers to be the single overriding issue in achieving
peace and democratization. The Queretero Accord unequivocally establishes the objective of
civilian control over the military, along with the restoration of respect for human rights and an end
to political repression. It is noteworthy that the document was signed by senior military officers
included among members of the government delegation. However, the Accord does not establish
procedures or mechanisms for implementing military subordination to civilian authority. Observers
have also pointed out that the agreement defines civilian authority only in the most general terms.
The human rights situation has dramatically deteriorated under the Serrano government. On
July 24, literally on the eve of the Queretero Accord, the Geneva-based International Council of
Voluntary Organizations (ICVO) charged that "the persistence of and increase in human rights
violations... creates skepticism about the viability of reaching peace accords through political
means...[Despite assertions to the contrary,] the Serrano administration is incapable of controlling
paramilitary groups and its own security forces." Most analysts concur that Serrano's pledges for
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peace were more than electoral rhetoric, and reflect the desires of important factions of Guatemala's
civilian and military elites. The latter perceive an end to military hostilities and some type of social
"concertacion" as the only means for overcoming the country's crisis, and bringing about political
and economic modernization. However, how far the government is willing or able to go in the
bargaining process is not clear. The peace talks have intensified divisions within the army and
rightist civilian allies, or between those who support a negotiations process, and extremist factions
opposed to any compromise and committed to elimination of the insurgency via military means.
Within days after the first round of talks in April, Guatemala was rocked by a wave of political
violence, attributed by observers to efforts by the extreme right to disrupt the incipient negotiations.
On June 20, a hard-line group of anonymous soldiers known as "Officers of the Mountain,"
resurfaced. These officers were reponsible for several abortive coups during Cerezo's final years
in office. The organization issued a communique accusing Serrano and the military leadership
of "treason" and threatening "reprisals" against all those who talk with the "subversives." Both
Serrano and Defense Minister General Enrique Mendoza have denounced the "Officers of the
Mountain." Diplomats in Guatemala City say government officials promoting the negotiations hope
to isolate the hard-liners as the talks progress, in part via gradually expanding involvement of the
UN and other international organizations. Meanwhile, both sides in the negotiations have been
jockeying for a more favorable position at the bargaining table. In mid-May, the army commenced
large-scale counterinsurgency drives in the western and northern mountain and jungle regions
where the guerrillas have been active. However, the military tenacity of the guerrilla movement
has been demonstrated via the army's inability to control or reduce rebel activities. Rebel actions
have steadily expanded since 1988, after having been contained in the fierce counterinsurgency
campaigns of 1982-85. In the month of July alone, URNG units carried out dozens of armed actions,
including the occupation of villages and highways, "armed propaganda," ambushes of army units
and police stations, and sabotage against components of the nation's economic infrastructure.
The URNG is considered capable of making its presence known in Guatemalan politics, and of
undermining the government's attempts at pacification and stabilization without rebel participation.
The URNG has constructed a significant social base in the countryside, particularly in the western
highlands, and among indigenous communities. Indigenous persons account for over 50% of all
Guatemalans. However, as the rebels themselves acknowledge, they do not have the strength to
make a bid for power. The rebels' biggest obstacle is a political climate of terror in Guatemala which
has decimated almost all legal, unarmed center-left forces with which the revolutionary movement
could develop alliances and coalitions. In fact, the current escalation of human rights violations
has resulted in the deaths of dozens of leftist and popular organization leaders, while dozens more
have fled the country or gone into hiding. Several political and trade union organizations have been
disabled. The escalation is attributed, in part, to efforts by the armed forces to destroy progressive
political parties and grassroots organizations prior to the conclusion of a peace agreement. In
an environment wiped clean of such groups, former URNG members' organizing capacity and
perspectives for building alliances would be crippled. Despite the uncertainties and roadblocks to
a peace accord, the talks are acquiring a dynamic of their own which neither the government nor
the URNG will be able to control or ignore. The negotiations have provided credibility to the rebels,
legitimized a political alternative to military conflict, and generated important expectations among
Guatemalans and in the international community.
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